The Experience of Transferee Courts Under the
Multidistrict Litigation Act
The Multidistrict Litigation Act' evolved from the experience of the
federal judiciary in handling the avalanche of litigation resulting from
the electrical equipment antitrust cases, in which over nineteen hundred related treble damage actions were filed within a twelve-month
period in thirty-six district courts. 2 To expedite the administration of
these suits, the Judicial Conference of the United States created the
Co-ordinating Committee for Multiple Litigation. Under its direction,
and through the voluntary cooperation of the district judges, discovery
for all parties was conducted on a unified, nationwide basis. 3 At the
completion of pretrial proceedings, cases were transferred according to
product line to selected transferee districts for trial.4 All cases were
either tried or settled within six years, the not unusual time span for
disposition of a single protracted antitrust action.
Perceiving a continuing need for such pretrial management, the Committee recommended the creation of a permanent mechanism for mandatory transfer of related multidistrict civil actions to a single district
for pretrial proceedings. 5 This proposal eventually resulted in the enactment of the present section 1407 of the Judicial Code, which establishes
the Judicial Panel on Multidistrict Litigation.
The purpose of pretrial transfer under section 1407 is to promote
efficient judicial administration without infringing on the rights of the
parties. 6 The subsequent experience of the transferee courts has demonstrated that multidistrict transfer is a valuable but incomplete device
toward this.end. In practice, the statutory mechanism has not functioned
as Congress intended. After an initial period of hesitancy, transferee
courts have steadily increased their control over pretrial proceedings far
1 28 U.S.C. § 1407 (1970).
2 S. REP. No. 454, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. 3 (1967); Neal & Goldberg, The Electrical Equipment Antitrust Cases: Novel Judicial Administration, 50 A.B.A.J. 621 (1964).
3 Peterson & McDermott, MultidistrictLitigation: New Forms of JudicialAdministration,

56 A.BA.J. 737, 737-38 (1970).
4 Transfers were made under the change-of-venue provision, 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a) (1970).
For a discussion of the relationship between this Act and section 1407, see text at notes
13-15 infra.
5 Peterson & McDermott, supra note 3, at 740.
6 Levy, Complex Multidistrict Litigation and the Federal Courts, 40 Fomr.AQt L. REy.

41 (1971).
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beyond the role envisioned by the drafters of the statute. Cases, once
centralized, have not been remanded to their original districts at the
completion of pretrial proceedings, and transfer for the limited purpose
of pretrial proceedings has become functionally equivalent to transfer
for all purposes, including trial on substantive legal issues.7 These interrelated developments have greatly altered the nature of a section 1407
transfer and necessitate reevaluation of the role of the Judicial Panel in
terms of the actual consequences of pretrial transfer.
This comment will explore the first four years of transferee court
activity under section 1407. The central focus will be on the current
practices and procedures adopted by transferee judges, their increasing
authority over pretrial proceedings, and their attempts to extend the
advantages of multidistrict transfer beyond the pretrial stage. Finally,
proposals for modification of the statute will be suggested to help effectuate its underlying purposes.
I.
A.

ACTIVITY OF THE JUDICIAL PANEL

The Statutory Requirements
Section 1407(a) provides:
When civil actions involving one or more common questions of fact
are pending in different districts, such actions may be transferred
to any district for coordinated or consolidated pretrial proceedings.
Such transfers shall be made by the judicial panel on multidistrict
litigation authorized by this section upon its determination that
transfers for such proceedings will be for the convenience of parties
and witnesses and will promote the just and efficient conduct of
such actions.8

The Judicial Panel consists of seven federal court of appeals and district
court judges appointed by the Chief Justice of the United States.9 In
any action in which transfer might be appropriate, the Panel, on its own
motion or that of any party, conducts hearings in which all parties subject to transfer may participate.' 0 On the record made at the hearing,
7 Although Congress envisioned that most transferred cases would be returned to the
transferor districts, the most intriguing aspect of the operation of section 1407 is the almost

total absence of reported cases that have been remanded. See text at notes 116-27 infra.
8 28 U.S.C. § 1407(a) (1970). The mechanics of multidistrict transfer are discussed in
Levy, supra note 6, and Comment, Pre-Trial Consolidation in Complex Federal MultiDistrict Litigation, 6 CoLum. J.L. & SocIAL PRoB. 433 (1970). For an earlier analysis of the
statute, see Comment, Consolidation of PretrialProceedings Under Proposed Section 1407
of the Judicial Code: Unanswered Questions of Transfer and Review, 33 U. CM. L. Rv.
558 (1966).
9 28 US.C. § 1407(d) (1970).
10 Id. § 1407(c).
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the Panel may order transfer of multidistrict cases to any district for
coordinated or consolidated pretrial proceedings. 1 It assigns the litigation to a single transferee judge, who conducts all pretrial procedures,
including discovery and the taking of depositions. After pretrial proceedings are completed, each action not previously terminated in the
transferee court must be remanded to the district from which it was
transferred.'2
Section 1407 makes transfer possible without regard to venue.' 3 Comparison with preexisting change-of-venue provisions under section
140414 reveals the flexibility of multidistrict transfer. Although section
1404(a) allows transfer of actions for all purposes, including trial, to a
district better suited to handle them, not all related cases can be transferred, 15 and there is no provision for coordinated management of transfer decisions. Section 1407 thus extends transfer to a broader range of
cases, but for a more restricted purpose; it gives the judiciary an additional method of dealing with multiple litigation where complete consolidation for both pretrial proceedings and trial is either impossible or
undesirable.
B.

Benefits and Costs of Pretrial Transfer

The primary objective of the Judicial Panel in applying section 1407
is the efficient employment of limited judicial resources. 16 Transfer of
11 Id. Review of orders to transfer is by extraordinary writ and must be filed in the
court of appeals having jurisdiction over the transferee court. Id. § 1407(e). In no reported case has this procedure been employed.
12 Id. § 1407(a). The Judicial Panel also prescribes rules for the conduct of its business.
Id. § 1407(t). The Rules of Procedure of the Judicial Panel on Multidistrict Litigation
appear at 53 F.R.D. 119 (1971); previous editions of the rules appear at 50 F.R.D. 203 (1970),
47 F.R.D. 377 (1969), and 44 F.R.D. 389 (1968).
28 U.S.C. § 1407(g) (1970) exempts government antitrust actions seeking injunctive or
other equitable relief from pretrial transfer; however, this section does not exclude transfer of government damage suits, in which the government in effect stands in the shoes of
a private party. S. REP. No. 454, supra note 2, at 6. Private litigants often recognize the
primacy of the government claim and agree to transfer of their cases to the district in
which the government filed its action for pretrial proceedings. See In re Alsco-Harvard
Fraud Litigation, 325 F. Supp. 315, 316 (J.P.M.L. 1971).
13 In re Revenue Properties Co., 809 F. Supp. 1002, 1004 (J.P.M.L. 1970).
14 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a) (1970). Section 1404(a) was adopted in 1948 and supersedes the
doctrine of forum non conveniens in the federal courts. C. WiRGHT, Fr DEAL COURTS 164-70
(2d ed. 1970). See Note, Consolidation and Transfer in the Federal Courts: 28 U.S.C. Section 1407 Viewed in Light of Rule 42(a) and 28 US.C. Section 1404(a), 22 HASTNGS L.J.

1289 (1971).
15 Hoffman v. Blaski, 363 U.S. 335 (1960), restricts transfers under section 1404(a) to
districts in which the action could originally have been brought.
16 Levy, supra note 6, at 49. Actions will not be transferred when discovery is proceeding
with a minimal degree of judicial supervision, despite their multidistrict character and
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all related cases to one district court results in a significant savings in
judicial manpower by eliminating the duplication of effort inherent in
simultaneous consideration of identical problems by several district
court judges. The man-hours thus conserved are available to reduce
docket congestion in the transferor districts.
An alternate aim of section 1407 is to eliminate the potential for conflicting contemporaneous pretrial rulings by district courts in related
civil actions. 1 To accomplish this purpose, appeals from transferee court
decisions must be filed in the court of appeals for the transferee district
rather than in those of the transferor districts;18 a multiplicity of review
proceedings is thereby avoided and the possibility of conflicting appellate rulings minimized."
Although designed primarily to achieve efficient judicial administration, section 1407 also requires that transfer serve the convenience of
the parties and witnesses. 20 Among the benefits accruing to the parties,
the most significant is the reduction in the costs of prosecuting or defending actions. Multiple, uncoordinated pretrial litigation in separate
districts entails exorbitant expenditures of time and resources in sequential resolution of identical problems. Under section 1407 transfer, these
litigation expenses are normally reduced through efficient judicial decision making, elimination of duplicative discovery, and prevention of
the presence of common questions of fact. See, e.g., In re Photocopy Paper, 305 F. Supp.
60, 62 (J.P.M.L. 1969); In re Texas Concrete Pipe, 302 F. Supp. 1342, 1343 (J.P.M.L. 1969).
17 In re Plumbing Fixtures, 298 F. Supp. 484, 490-92 (J.P.M.L. 1968); H.R. REP. No.
1130, 90th Cong., 2d Sess. 2 (1968).
18 Utah v. American Pipe & Constr. Co., 316 F. Supp. 837, 839 (C.D. Cal. 1970) (West of
Rockies Concrete Pipe). The order of transfer issued by the Panel is filed in the office of
the clerk of the transferee court, 28 U.S.C. § 1407(c) (1970); venue and jurisdiction is vested
in the transferee court and thus in the court of appeals for that district. Utah v. American
Pipe & Constr. Co., supra.
19 Conservation of judicial resources is also promoted by the selection of the transferee
district; the Judicial Panel frequently transfers multidistrict cases to a judge already
familiar with the factual and legal problems in the litigation because of his previous
experience with one or more of the related actions. E.g., In re Carrom Trademark Litigation, 322 F. Supp. 1016 (J.P.M.L. 1971); in re IBM, 302 F. Supp. 796 (J.P.M.L. 1969). But
see In re Water Meters, 304 F. Supp. 873 (J.P.M.L. 1969).
20 Levy, supra note 6, at 50; see In re Plumbing Fixtures, 298 F. Supp. 484, 499 (J.P.M.L.
1968) (quoting Report of the Co-ordinating Committee on Multiple Litigation Recommending New Section 1407, Title 28). Section 1407 was amended to include the provision
requiring transfer to serve the convenience of the parties and witnesses. According to the
legislative history,
[t]he main purpose of transfer for consolidation or coordination of pretrial proceedings
is to promote the ends of efficient justice, but the convenience of parties and witnesses
should also be a factor in determining whether such transfer should be made. Although
implicit in the bill, as introduced, this amendment makes it clear that the convenience
of parties and witnesses shall be weighed as a factor in determining whether transfer
should be made.
S. Rn,. No. 454, supra note 2, at 2.
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inconsistent trial court and appellate decision .21 Although certain
parties may incur additional expenses if their cases are transferred, these
costs are usually limited to travel by their attorneys to the transferee district for pretrial conferences 22 and pale into insignificance beside the
overall savings from and convenience of centralized pretrial proceed23
ings.
An additional savings to the parties is achieved through the appointment by the transferee judge of liaison counsel for each side in order to
conductthe routine paperwork and minutiae of pretrial proceedings. 24
This procedure not only minimizes the cost of the litigation, but also
allows parties with few resources to be fully represented by counsel after
transfer.2 5
The primary disadvantage of section 1407 transfer is that it deprives
plaintiffs of the right to conduct pretrial proceedings in any district in
which they could have brought an action and forces defendants to lidgate in a district in which the could not have been sued. 26 The parties'
21 For the parties as a group, centralized discovery results in shared costs for common
information and more immediate access to the witnesses and documents of the other side.

Centrally conducted deposition taking, for example, eliminates delay ensuing from individual interrogation of the same deponent. In the Plumbing Fixtures litigation, thirtyfour lawyers required twenty-three days to take the deposition of one witness. Wall Street
Journal, Jan. 18, 1972, at 13, col. 2 (Midwest ed.). Separate deposition taking by each of
more than three hundred plaintiffs would have produced intolerable delay in the completion of pretrial proceedings. For similar experience in the electrical equipment cases, see
Hearings on S. 3815 Before the Subcomm. on Improvements in Judicial Machinery of the
Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 89th Cong., 1st Sess., ser. 18, pt. 1, at 26-27 (1966) (testimony of Charles A. Bane) [hereinafter cited as Hearings on S. 3815].
22 In re Plumbing Fixtures, 302 F. Supp. 795, 796 (J.P.M.L. 1969). The transferee judge
can schedule conferences to minimize even this expense. See In re San Juan, P.R. Air Crash
Disaster, 316 F. Supp. 981, 982 (J.P.M.L. 1970).
23 In re Antibiotic Drugs, 295 F. Supp. 1402, 1404 (J.P.M.L. 1968); In re Plumbing Fixtures, 302 F. Supp. 795 (J.P.M.L. 1969). The convenience of witnesses is an issue rarely
raised in- opposition to multidistrict transfer except in mass tort cases, in which the witnesses and information relating to the victim's life expectancy, medical history, and future
earning power are located in the transferor district. See In re Air Crash at Las Vegas, Nev.,
336 F. Supp. 414, 415 (J.P.M.L. 1972); In re Air Crash Disaster at Hanover, N.H., MDL
Docket No. 43 (D.N.H., filed June 29, 1971); text at notes 128-32 infra.
24 Panel Rule 5(d) empowers the transferee judge to select liaison counsel. Such counsel
receive notices from the court on behalf of all counsel, arrange distribution of notices to
all other counsel, and act as spokesmen at pretrial conferences. Liaison counsel coordinate
discovery to avoid repetition and insure the orderly and expeditious conduct of discovery
and pretrial hearings. See Practice and Procedure Order upon Transfer Pursuant to 28
U.S.C. § 1407(a), In re Santa Monica Air Crash Disaster, MDL Docket No. 34 (C.D. Cal.,
filed May 25, 1970).
25 The interest of the parties in minimizing the costs of the litigation is legitimate and
deserves judicial protection. See In re "East of the Rockies" Concrete Pipe, 302 F. Supp.
244, 249 (J.P.M.L. 1969).
26 See Comment, Pre-Trial Consolidation in Complex Federal Multi-District Litigation,
supra note 8, at 445. Another possible source of inconvenience and inefficiency is the poten-
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rights, however, are protected upon transfer. The transferee court must
apply the substantive law of the transferor district in each case; and
the plaintiffs' choice-of-law preference among districts, especially with
regard to wrongful death damage limitations, is respected. 27
When the interests of the parties conflict, the dispute before the Judicial Panel often concerns the selection of the proper transferee district
rather than the appropriateness of pretrial transfer. 28 In making its decision, the Panel must weigh the comparative advantages of potentiall
transferee forums and determine which will be most convenient for the
aggregate of the parties.20 The Panel frequently transfers cases to the district in which discovery has advanced furthest" or in which the most
complete store of documents is available. 31
In selecting the transferee district, the Judicial Panel has realized that
many factors serving the interests of the parties also promote judicial.
efficiency. The status of the prospective transferee court's docket is particularly important, 32 since both the parties and the judiciary want to
avoid assignment of the litigation to an already heavily burdened judge.
tial for delay in the disposition of cases by untimely entry of a transfer order. Because
trial would be delayed, the Judicial Panel will not transfer a case in which pretrial proceedings are nearly complete. E.g., In re Concrete Pipe, 297 F. Supp. 1125, 1126 (J.P.M.L.
1968). The Panel will not transfer cases if it would interfere with normal appellate review
of transferor court rulings, In re Plumbing Fixtures, 298 F. Supp. 484, 496 (J.P.M.L. 1968),
or with reasonable settlement activity, see In re Hotel Tel. Charge Antitrust Litigation,
MDL Docket No. 89 (J.P.M.L., filed Mar. 30, 1972); In re Air Crash at New Orleans,
La., 331 F. Supp. 554 (J.P.M.L. 1971). Nor will it order transfer when a voluntary plan
for pretrial coordination of discovery efforts is succeeding, see In re Kauffman Mutual
Fund Actions, 337 F. Supp. 1337, 1339 (J.P.M.L. 1972), or when there is a reasonable prospect that resolution of change-of-venue motions will eliminate the multidistrict character
of the litigation, In re Deering Milliken Patent, 328 F. Supp. 504 (J.P.M.L. 1970). But see
In re Government Auto Fleet Sales, 328 F. Supp. 218, 219 (J.P.M.L. 1971).
27 Van Dusen v. Barrack, 376 U.S. 612 (1964); see Hearings on S. 3815, supra note 21, at
13 (testimony of Dean Phil C. Neal).
28 In re Air Fare Litigation, 322 F. Supp. 1013, 1015 (J.P.M.L. 1971).
29 In re "East of the Rockies" Concrete Pipe, 302 F. Supp. 244, 253 (J.P.M.L. 1969)
(Weigel, J., concurring), outlines the balancing process and provides a comprehensive discussion of the various factors weighed by the Panel in making a transfer decision.
30 E.g., In re Antibiotic Drugs, 295 F. Supp. 1402, 1403 (J.P.M.L. 1968).
31 Appropriate considerations in selecting the transferee district include the location of
grand jury records, e.g., In re Motor Vehicle Air Pollution Control Equip., 311 F. Supp.
1349 (J.P.M.L. 1970); the site of pending reorganization proceedings, e.g., In re Penn Central Sec. Litigation, 322 F. Supp. 1021 (J.P.M.L. 1971); the situs of disasters, e.g., In re Air
Crash Disaster at Ardmore, Okla., 295 F. Supp. 45 (J.P.M.L. 1968); and the location of
corporate files, e.g., In re Protection Devices & Equip., 295 F. Supp. 39 (J.P.M.L. 1968).
In nationwide litigation, the Panel will often choose a centrally located transferee district in order to reduce the expense and inconvenience of counsel. See In re Butterfield
Patent Infringement, 328 F. Supp. 513 (J.P.M.L. 1970).
32 See In re Career Academy Antitrust Litigation, MDL Docket No. 98 (J.P.M.L., filed
Apr. 28, 1972); In re Silver Bridge Disaster, 311 F. Supp. 1345 (J.P.M.L. 1970).
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When, as often occurs, no judge in the district most appropriate for pretrial proceedings is able to support a substantial addition to his case
load, section 1407(b) permits the Panel to assign a judge to the transferee district on a temporary basis. 33 This procedure allows optimal use
of judicial resources to expedite disposition of the cases; judges and
cases can be transferred throughout the country to conduct pretrial proceedings in the most expeditious manner.34
Transfer does not, of course, necessarily serve the interests of justice,
efficiency, and convenience of the parties simply because common questions of fact are present.35 The crucial question remains whether the
economies of transfer outweigh the resulting inconvenience to the
parties.3 6 The Judicial Panel must decide whether transfer will serve the
83 28 U.S.C. § 1407(b) (1970).
34 The Chief Justice has made eight intercircuit assignments under 28 U.S.C. § 292(d)
(1970) and one under 28 U.S.C. § 294(d) (1970) (In re Cross-Florida Barge Canal Litigation,
329 F. Supp. 543 (J.P.M.L. 1971)); manpower has been transferred from less congested circuits to those with substantial docket delays. The Second Circuit has had outside transferee judges assigned three times, and the District of Columbia, First, Third, Fifth, Ninth,
and Tenth Circuits have had one judge assigned to each.
The intracircuit assignment under 28 US.C. § 292(b) (1970) has been used five times, all
but once to transfer manpower from the less congested districts of the Ninth Circuit to
the Northern District of California, which has been laboring under a substantial backload.
The exception is In re Silver Bridge Disaster, 311 F. Supp. 1845 (J.P.M.L. 1970).
Members of the Panel have been designated transferee judges in In re Admission Tickets,
802 F. Supp. 1339 (J.P.M.L. 1969) (Robson, J.); In re San Juan, P.R. Air Crash Disaster,
316 F. Supp. 981 (J.P.M.L. 1970) (Weinfeld, J.); and In re Penn Central Sec. Litigation,
322 F. Supp, 1021 (J.P.M.L. 1971) (Lord, J.).
35 According to the legislative history, section 1407 was not to be used where only two
or three cases were pending in different districts, since in such a situation there was no
need for centralized judicial management. H.R. Ran. No. 1180, supra note 17, at 4; S.
REP. No. 454, supra note 2, at 4. Transfer was denied on this basis in In re Scotch Whiskey,
299 F. Supp. 543 (J.P.M.L. 1969) (two cases in two districts); In re Homemakers Franchise
Litigation, 337 F. Supp. 1342 (J.P.M.L. 1972); In re Iowa Beef Packers, Inc., 309 F. Supp.
1259 (J.P.M.L. 1970); and In re Photocopy Paper, 305 F. Supp. 60 (J.P.M.L. 1969).
An exception to this principle was made for a few cases sharing unusually complex questions of fact. H.R. REP. No. 1180, supra note 17, at 4. In In re IBM, 802 F. Supp. 796
(J.P.M.L. 1969), three cases requiring extensive and complex discovery were held to be
within this-exception and were transferred for consolidated or coordinated pretrial proceedings. Extension of the IBM doctrine to justify transfer in cases sharing far less complex factual questions has minimized the operational effectiveness of the Scotch Whiskey
doctrine. See In re Cross-Florida Barge Canal Litigation, 329 F. Supp. 543 (J.P.M.L. 1971)
(two cases); In re CBS Licensing Antitrust Litigation, 328 F. Supp. 511 (J.P.M.L. 1971) (two
cases); In re Brown Co. Sec. Litigation, 325 F. Supp. 807 (J.P.M.L. 1971) (four cases); In re
Willingham Patent, 322 F. Supp. 1019 (J.P.M.L. 1971) (three cases); In re Carrom Trademark Litigation, 322 F. Supp. 1016 (J.P.M.L. 1971) (four cases).
36 A dispute has arisen within the Panel, for example, on the substantiality of common
factual questions sufficient to justify transfer. The Panel has transferred several dockets
of patent infringement cases in which the defendants have challenged the validity of the
patent. The majority has found that the common factual question of patent validity alone
justifies transfer, but the dissenters argue that the essential question in the cases is patent
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overall convenience of all parties to the litigation. 17 In balancing these
interests, the transfer order often relies on the transferee court's ability
to resolve the complex problems posed by wholesale transfer of cases
with conflicting legal theories and discovery demands. The effectiveness
of section 1407 must, therefore, depend on the extent to which transferee courts have been able to conduct transferred litigation economically and efficiently.
II.

AcrWTy

OF TRANSFEREE COURTS

Section 1407(a), as noted, provides that related multidistrict civil actions may be transferred to any district for coordinated or consolidated
pretrial proceedings. The House Report defines pretrial proceedings as
"the practice and procedure which precede the trial of an action."3 8 Although the term obviously encompasses deposition and discovery, the
extent to which it includes the power to rule on questions of law has
been challenged by some judges.3 9 The House Report states, however,
that the transferee judge shall have the same power as any other district
judge to make dispositive legal rulings.40 The Judicial Panel has simiinfringement, which is more suited to local discovery in the districts in which the actions
were brought. See In re Embro Patent Infringement Litigation, 328 F. Supp. 507, 509
(J.P.M.L. 1971) (Weigel, J., dissenting); In re Willingham Patent, 322 F. Supp. 1019, 1021
(J.P.M.L. 1971); In re Carrom Trademark Litigation, 322 F. Supp. 1016, 1019 (J.P.M.L.
1971); In re Butterfield Patent Infringement, 328 F. Supp. 513, 515 (J.P.M.L. 1970). But see
In re Kaehni Patent, 311 F. Supp 1342, 1344 (1970) (Weigel, J., concurring), in which the
question of infringement was common to all defendants because it allegedly involved a
single device.
37 In re Library Editions of Children's Books, 297 F. Supp. 385, 386 (J.P.M.L. 1968).
Transfer may inconvenience an individual party, since his interests favor having all proceedings in his action handled in his district; the Panel, however, rejects the "worm's eye
view" of section 1407 and considers whether the aggregate convenience of parties and witnesses will be served by transfer to a particular forum. See In re IBM, MDL Docket No. 18
(J.P.M.L., filed Apr. 19, 1972).
38 H.R. REP. No. 1130, supra note 17, at 3.
39 "The Powers of Transferee Judges," an address prepared in May, 1971, by Judge
Philip Neville of the District of Minnesota, responded to numerous questions raised about
the power of transferee judges to rule on questions of law. A copy of the address is on file
at The University of Chicago Law Review.
40 H.R. REP. No. 1130, supra note 17, at 3; see Hearings on S. 3815, supra note 21, at
13-14 (testimony of Dean Phil C. Neal). Nor can only the common questions of fact be
transferred to the transferee forum, with the remaining issues left in the transferor courts.

Section 1407 does not authorize the severance of questions of law, but requires that they
be transferred to the transferee court. In re Revenue Properties Co., 333 F. Supp. 558

(J.P.M.L. 1971).
28 U.S.C. § 1407(a) (1970) allows the Panel to exempt any claims, counter-claims, crossclaims, or third-party claims from transfer with the rest of the action. See In re Penn
Central Sec. Litigation, 325 F. Supp. 309 (J.P.M.L. 1971), In re Antibiotic Drugs, 309 F.
Supp. 155 (J.P.M.L. 1970).
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larly noted that pretrial, as an adjective, describes all judicial proceedings before trial,41 including motions to dismiss and motions for summary judgment. 42 Nevertheless, Congress perceived the power to make
legal rulings only as an adjunct to the discovery process, a practical
necessity if factual discovery was to be accomplished. 43 The activity of
transferee courts under section 1407 demonstrates the erosion of this
principle.
A.

Discovery
Control of discovery proceedings is the essence of the transferee
judge's role, and his powers in this area are comprehensive. Although
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure anticipate that discovery will be
directed by the parties, the Manual for Complex and MultidistrictLitigation," published by the Co-ordinating Committee as a guide to trans-

feree judges, recommends strict judicial supervision of all aspects of pretrial proceedings. 45 Naturally, the transferee judge has full power to deal
with all legal problems arising in discovery.4
41 In re Plumbing Fixtures, 298 F. Supp. 484, 495-96 (J.P.M.L. 1968).
42 Panel Rule 15(e) provides that "actions terminated in the transferee court by settlement, dismissal or summary judgment shall not be remanded by the Panel and shall be
dismissed by the transferee court."
43 Hearings on S. 3815, supra note 21, at 14 (testimony of Dean Neal); id. at 21-22
(testimony of Judge William H. Becker).
44 1 MooRE, FEDERAL PRAcrxcE pt. 2 (2d ed. 1971).
45 Id. § 1. 1; see In re Library Editions of Children's Books, 297 F. Supp. 385, 386 (J.P.M.L.
1968). Section 1407 transfer does not terminate discovery orders issued in the transferor
courts; they remain in effect until the transferee judge assumes effective control of the
litigation at the first pretrial conference. In re Master Key, 320 F. Supp. 1404, 1407
(J.P.M.L. 1971).
46 Issues decided by transferee judges and reported include the following:
Attorney-client privilege: Pfizer, Inc. v. Lord, 5 TRADE REG. REP. (1972 Trade Cas.)
78,847 (8th Cir. Feb. 15, 1972) (mandamus directing transferee judge to vacate discovery
order); Jack Winter, Inc. v. Koratron Co., 54 F.R.D. 44 (N.D. Cal. 1971); Jack Winter, Inc. v.
Koratron Co., 50 F.R.D. 225 (N.D. Cal. 1970); Illinois v. Harper & Row Publishers, Inc., 50
F.R.D. 37 (N.D. IMI. 1969), mandamus denied sub. nom. Harper & Row Publishers, Inc. v.
Decker, 423 F.2d 487 (7th Cir. 1970), aff'd by an equally divided Court, 400 U.S. 348 (1971)
(Children'sBooks).
Public policy privilege: In re Four Seasons Sec. Laws Litigation, CCH FEn. SEC. L. REP.
93,400 (W.D. Okla. Mar., 1972); In re Puerto Rico Air Disaster Litigation, 11 Av. Cas.
18,130 (D.P.R. 1971); In re Puerto Rico Air Disaster Litigation, 11 Av. Cas. 18,125 (D.P.R.
1971); Farrell v. Piedmont Aviation, Inc., 50 F.R.D. 385 (W.D.N.C. 1969) (Hendersonville
Air Crash Disaster).
Venue discovery: ABC Great States, Inc. v. Globe Ticket Co., 304 F. Supp. 1052 (N.D.
Il. 1969) (Admissions Tickets).
Motions to compel answers to interrogatories: In re Master Key, 53 F.R.D. 87 (D. Conn.
1971); Philadelphia Housing Authority v. American Radiator & Standard Sanitary Corp.,
50 F.R.D. 13 (E.D. Pa. 1970), aff'd sub. nom. Mangano v. American Radiator & Standard
Sanitary Corp., 438 F.2d 1187 (3d Cir. 1971).
For other pretrial rulings, see Weidberg v. American Airlines, Inc., 36 F. Supp. 407
(N.D. Ill. 1972) (Air Fare) (motion to stay proceedings); California v. American Radiator
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The Judicial Panel leaves the resolution of conflicting demands of the
parties to the discretion of the transferee judge,47 who, by virtue of his
day-to-day contact with the litigation, is in the best position to determine the most just and efficient method of conducting discovery.4 The
Panel also will not hesitate to assign cases involving different legal questions but common factual bases to a single judge for coordinated or consolidated pretrial proceedings.4 9 The transferee judge can decide which
issues are subject to consolidated discovery"° and determine the best
procedure for scheduling noncommon discovery.51 By this method, he
can prevent the more complex discovery issues from engulfing and im52
peding the development of other cases.
Without interfering with the transferee judge's discretionary author& Standard Sanitary Corp., 309 F. Supp. 1057 (E.D. Pa. 1969) (Plumbing Fixtures) (motion
to amend complaint); Control Data Corp. v. IBM, 306 F. Supp. 839 (D. Minn. 1969) (motion
to strike allegations from pleadings).
47 The Panel has neither the power nor the disposition to instruct the transferee judge
how to conduct pretrial proceedings. In re Plumbing Fixtures, 298 F. Supp. 484, 489
(J.P.M.L. 1968).
48 In re Penn Central Sec. Litigation, 333 F. Supp. 382 (J.P.M.L. 1971).
49 See In re Air Crash Disaster at the Greater Cincinnati Airport, 295 F. Supp. 51
(J.P.M.L. 1968).
50 Coordinated pretrial proceedings are appropriate where the transferred cases include
two or more distinct groups of cases with potential conflicts of interest or conflicts in discovery objectives but with substantial common questions of fact. The transferee judge can
consolidate the proceedings within each group and determine the degree of common discovery appropriate between the groups. The Panel will not attempt to anticipate the
degree of coordination or consolidation that may be desirable in transferred cases. See In
re Penn Central Sec. Litigation, 322 F. Supp. 1021, 1023 n.4 (J.P.M.L. 1971).
Transfer for coordinated pretrial proceedings has been appropriate in In re Four Seasons Sec. Laws Litigation, 328 F. Supp. 221 (J.P.M.L. 1971); In re Penn Central Sec.
Litigation, supra; In re Grain Shipments, 319 F. Supp. 533 (J.P.M.L. 1970); In re SeeburgCommonwealth United Merger, 312 F. Supp. 909 (J.P.M.L. 1970); and In re Revenue Properties Co., 309 F. Supp. 1002 (J.P.M.L. 1970).
51 In re Grain Shipments, 319 F. Supp. 533 (J.P.M.L. 1970). The transferee judge can
also determine which questions should be left for local discovery in the transferor districts after remand of the actions. See In re Frost Patent, 316 F. Supp. 977, 980 (J.P.M.L.
1970).
52 See In re Seeburg-Commonwealth United Merger, 312 F. Supp. 909 (J.P.M.L. 1970).
Panel Rule I defines a "tag-along" case as an action sharing factual questions common
to actions previously transferred under section 1407, but which was filed or came to the
attention of the Panel after the initial hearing. Under Panel Rule 12, these actions are
automatically transferred to the transferee court upon issuance of a conditional transferorder by the Clerk of the Panel unless the parties object within fifteen days. A frequent
objection to transfer in tag-along cases is the asserted difficulty and expense in catching up
with already completed discovery. The Panel has held that these difficulties are outweighted
by the benefits to all parties in centralizing the litigation. In re Koratron Patent Litigation,
327 F. Supp. 559 (J.P.M.L. 1971). The transferee judge has great latitude to make previously
produced discovery available to all new parties and to allow them to supplement it, if
necessary, and thus obtain an earlier trial. Id. at 560. See also In re Antibiotic Drugs, 327 F.
Supp. 617 (J.P.M.L. 1971).
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ity, the Judicial Panel keeps informed of the progress of pretrial proceedings. The Panel does not serve as a court of appeals for decisions of
the transferee courts, 5 3 but does exercise some supervision over the han-

dling of pretrial proceedings to insure that they are carried out justly
and efficiently. 4 The Panel also conducts meetings to inform transferee
judges of the experience of other districts and to assist them in dealing
with the unique pretrial problems posed by multidistrict transfer. 5
B.

Venue and Jurisdictional Problems

The authority to effect a section 1407 transfer is not vitiated by either
lack of proper service, lack of notice of the transfer hearing, or improperly laid venue in the transferor district.56 In the Children'sBook litigation, 57 for example, the Judicial Panel held that it could transfer a case
even if some named codefendants had been neither served with process
nor given notice of the transfer hearing. Since transfers under both section 1404(a) and section 1406(a)58 may be made without personal jurisdiction over the codefendant, 9 the Panel concluded that Congress intended section 1407 to operate similarly. To restrict transfer to cases in
which all defendants have been served would, according to the Panel,
frustrate centralized pretrial management without meaningfully advancing any other substantial interest.0 0 Moreover, a transfer under
section 1407 would not eliminate the requirement that proper service
53 See In re Plumbing Fixtures, 332 F. Supp. 1047 (J.P.M.L. 1971).
54 See Hearings on S. 3815, supra note 21, at 23 (testimony of Judge Becker). In the
Antibiotic Drug litigation, in which the burden of handling both the settling and non-

settling cases became too great for one judge, the Panel assigned the latter group of cases
to a new transferee judge. In re Antibiotic Drugs, 320 F. Supp. 586 (J.P.M.L. 1970). The
transferee judge was also replaced in the Plumbing Fixtures litigation. Philadelphia Housing Authority v. American Radiator & Standard Sanitary Corp., 323 F. Supp. 364 (E.D. Pa.
1970). In In re Penn Central Sec. Litigation, 325 F. Supp. 309, 311 n.2 (J.P.M.L. 1971), the
Panel found it impossible for one judge to conduct pretrial proceedings efficiently in both
conflicting groups of cases and remanded the commercial paper cases, assigning them to
another transferee district.
5 The Fourth Transferee Judge Meeting was held in Chandler, Arizona, in December,
1971. Materials on file at The University of Chicago Law Review.

56 In re Library Editions of Children's Books, 299 F. Supp. 1139, 1141 (J.P.M.L. 1969).
57 Id.
68 28 U.S.C. § 1406(a) (1970) provides that a district court may dismiss or, if in the
interest of justice, transfer a case laying venue in the wrong district to any district in
which it could have been brought.
59 Goldlawr, Inc. v. Heiman, 369 U.S. 463 (1962) (section 1406(a)); United States v.
Berkowitz, 328 F.2d 358 (3d Cir. 1964) (section 1404(a)).
60 The Panel is aware of the charge that plaintiffs have filed the same complaint in
different districts in order to necessitate multidistrict transfer and thereby avoid the venue
requirements of antitrust law. Proper venue, however, is not a criterion for deciding the
propriety of section 1407 transfer. In re Hotel Tel. Charge Antitrust Litigation, MDL
Docket No. 89 (J.P.M.L., filed Mar. 30, 1972).
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must be made on each defendant. Even if a party were served after
transfer, he might still raise any motions available to a party served
before transfer, including motions to quash service or to dismiss for
want of jurisdiction. Although it was initially unclear in which forum
such motions should be made, transferee courts have since routinely
considered them.61
Subsequent decisions of transferee courts demonstrate that violation
of technical venue and service requirements will not normally prevent a
party's inclusion in centralized pretrial proceedings. In the Children's
Books litigation, 62 the defendants brought motions in the transferee
court to quash service of process and to dismiss for improper venue. Although the court held that venue was improper as to some defendants,
it did not dismiss the actions, but instead severed them from the main
body of the litigation and announced that it would exercise its authority
under section 1406(a) to transfer them to a district of proper venue after
pretrial proceedings were completed.
One of the factors influencing transferee courts in denying motions to
dismiss for improper venue is that dismissal or transfer to a proper district before the completion of pretrial proceedings will usually result in
immediate retransfer of the actions to the transferee district as "tagalong" cases. In Maricopa County v. American Petrofina, Inc., 63 the

transferee court refused to quash defective service, despite the fact that
the summons was unsigned, undated, and unsealed. The court noted
that upon dismissal the plaintiffs could always obtain a valid service,
and the action would then be retransferred, gaining the defendant
nothing but time. Discovery would meanwhile be going forward in all
other cases; and to the extent that related cases were not included in
pretrial proceedings, the benefits of coordination or consolidation
would be diminished. The court therefore held the defendant estopped
from asserting that service was improper. 4
61 Initially, the Judicial Panel did not indicate whether transferor or transferee courts
should decide such motions. In re Library Editions of Children's Books, 299 F. Supp. 1139,
1142 n.1 (J.P.M.L. 1969). In re Gypsum Wallboard, 802 F. Supp. 794 (J.P.M.L. 1969), noted
that transferee judges were deciding such motions, citing Monkelis v. Trans World
Airlines, Inc., 303 F. Supp. 651 (E.D. Ky. 1969) (Cincinnati Air Crash) (third-party com-

plaint dismissed for lack of jurisdiction over defendant). See In re Penn Central Sec.
Litigation, 338 F. Supp. 488 (E.D. Pa. 1972); In re Penn Central Sec. Litigation, 388 F.
Supp. 436 (E.D. Pa. 1972); Miller v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 802 F. Supp 174 (E.D. Ky.
1969).
62 Illinois v. Harper & Row Publishers, Inc., 308 F. Supp. 1207 (N.D. IllI. 1969); accord,
ABC Great States, Inc. v. Globe Ticket Co., 310 F. Supp. 739 (N.D. Ill. 1970); Philadelphia
Housing Authority v. American Radiator & Standard Sanitary Corp., 309 F. Supp. 1053

(E.D. Pa. 1969).
63 322 F. Supp. 467 (N.D. Cal. 1971) (Western Liquid Asphalt).
64 See In re Koratron Patent Litigation, 314 F. Supp. 60 (J.P.M.L. 1970). A suit was
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Jurisdictional defects, as opposed to technically improper service, notice, or venue, remain a major exception to the transferee courts' broad
inclusionary policy. Since section 1407 did not expand the territorial
limits of effective service, 65 a party not subject to the jurisdiction of the
transferor court but amenable to service in the transferee district may
not be joined to an action by service in the transferee district after transfer. In Allegheny Airlines, Inc. v. LeMay,6 6 a third-party complaint
against a party not subject to suit in the transferor court was dismissed
for want of personal jurisdiction, even though the party could have been
served in the transferee district. Save for this limitation, however, transferee courts are very reluctant to delay pretrial proceedings in any case
that will eventually be subject to transfer.
C.

Injunctive Relief

Although the transferee court can grant injunctive relief as part of
normal pretrial proceedings,6 7 a motion for a preliminary injunction
could involve substantial discovery and upset the pretrial schedule
adopted at the pretrial conferences. 68 The transferee judge, controlling the entire litigation, will not issue an injunction unless it would
not interfere with the rights of other parties to coordinated or consolidated pretrial proceedings. 69
D.

Settlements
Multidistrict litigation may be teminated by settlement in the transferee court, and widespread settlement activity has taken place under the
supervision of transferee judges.7 0 Negotiated settlements of litigation
dismissed for improper venue, but while the appeal was still pending (subsequently
-affirmed in Koratron Co. v. Lion Uniform, 449 F.2d 337 (9th Cir. 1971)), an identical case
was filed in a district of proper venue and was retransferred to the transferee district as
a tag-along case.
65 In re Library Editions of Children's Books, 299 F. Supp. 1139, 1142 (J.P.M.L. 1969).
66 448 F.2d 1341 (7th Cir. 1971) (Mid-Air Crash nearFairland,Ind.).
67 See American Bible Soe'y v. Blount, 446 F.2d 588 (3d Cir. 1971) (Fourth Class Postage
Regulation); In re International House of Pancakes Franchise Litigation, 5 TRADE REG.
RE,. (1972 Trade Cas.)
73,797 (W.D. Mo. Jan. 4, 1972).
68 Control Data Corp. v. IBM, 1970 Trade Cas. 89,162 (D. Minn. 1970).
69 Id.; see also In re Motor Vehicle Air Pollution Control Equip., 1970 Trade Cas.
89,254 (C.D. Cal. 1970).
70 See Panel Rule 15(e). Major settlements have occurred in the following cases: Lindy
Bros. Builders, Inc. v. American Radiator & Standard Sanitary Corp., 5 TRADE REG. REP.
(1972 Trade Cas.)
73,953 (E.D. Pa. Apr. 28, 1972); In re Revenue Properties Co., MDL
Docket No. 32 (D. Mass., filed Jan. 26, 1972); Hartford Hosp. v. Chas. Pfizer 9- Co., 52
F.R.D. 131 (S.D.N.Y. 1971); West Virginia v. Chas. Pfizer & Co., 314 F. Supp. 710 (S.D.N.Y.
1970), aff'd, 440 F.2d 1079 (2d Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 871 (1971) (Antibiotic Drugs);
Philadelphia Housing Authority v. American Radiator & Standard Sanitary Corp., 323 F.
Supp. 364 (E.D..Pa. 1970), settlement approved, 322 F. Supp. 834 (E.D. Pa.), aff'd sub. nom.

1972]

Experience of Transferee Courts

involving class action claims, however, have proved very difficult to
administer. Transferee judges have had to determine appropriate class
definitions, adequate class representatives, and proper notice and exclusion procedures; ultimately, they have had to approve the fairness of the
compromise agreement, weighing the difficulty of prevailing on the
merits at trial against the size of the award. 1 After final approval of the
settlement, the transferee judge must retain jurisdiction to supervise
distribution of the fund to class members, proof of claims, and determination of expenses and legal fees. 72 Only upon resolution of these
problems will the court enter final judgment for the defendants and
dismiss the actions.
E.

Dismissal and Summary Judgment

As authorized by the Judicial Panel's rule 15(d), transferee courts
routinely consider motions to dismiss transferred cases.73 Since such motions are usually considered before trial, they constitute pretrial proceedings within the jurisdiction of the transferee judge.
Although pretrial transfer is based on the existence of common questions of fact, transferee courts frequently resolve common questions of
law by summary judgment.7 4 The legislative history of section 1407
clearly empowers transferee judges to exercise the summary judgment
power,75 but the drafters regarded this power as essential to the transAce Heating & Plumbing Co. v. Crane Co., 453 F.2d 30 (3d Cir. 1971); Penn Central Cominertial Paper Litigation, Wall Street Journal, Apr. 27, 1972, at 20, col. 4 (Midwest ed.).
For a discussion of the propriety of allowing attorney fees and expenses in the creation
of a settlement fund in multidistrict cases, see Lindy Bros. Builders, supra.
71 West Virginia v. Chas. Pfizer & Co., 314 F. Supp. 710, 740-41 (S.D.N.Y. 1970).
72 Hartford Hosp. v. Chas. Pfizer & Co., 52 F.R.D. 131, 138 (S.D.N.Y. 1971); West Virginia v. Chas. Pfizer & Co., 314 F. Supp. 710 (S.D.N.Y. 1970).
73 E.g., Dorfman v. First Boston Corp., 336 F. Supp. 1089 (E.D. Pa. 1972) (Penn Central
Securities) (motions to dismiss for failure to state a claim granted in part); In re Antibiotic
Antitrust Actions, 333 F. Supp. 315 (S.D.N.Y. 1971) (motion to dismiss denied); In re Antibiotic Antitrust Actions 333 F. Supp. 296 (S.D.N.Y. 1971), aff'd, 450 F.2d 1119 (2d Cir. 1971)
(motion to dismiss for res judicata granted); In re Motor Vehicle Air Pollution Control
Equip., 52 F.R.D. 398 (C.D. Cal. 1970) (motion to dismiss for impropriety of maintaining
class actions granted); Philadelphia Housing Authority v. American Radiator & Standard
Sanitary Corp., 50 F.R.D. 13 (E.D. Pa. 1970), aff'd sub. nom. Mangano v. American Radiator
& Standard Sanitary Corp., 438 F.2d 1187 (3rd Cir. 1971) (motion to dismiss for failure to
answer interrogatories granted).
74 E.g., In re Antibiotic Antitrust Actions, 333 F. Supp. 313 (S.D.N.Y. 1971); In re Antibiotic Antitrust Actions, 333 F. Supp. 310 (S.D.N.Y. 1971); Jack Winter, Inc. v. Koratron
Co., 329 F. Supp. 211 (N.D. Cal. 1971); Jack Winter, Inc. v. Koratron Co., 327 F. Supp.
206 (N.D. Cal. 1971); Maricopa County v. American Radiator & Standard Sanitary Corp.,
323 F. Supp. 381 (E.D. Pa. 1970); See In re Gypsum Wallboard, MDL Docket No. 14
(J.P.M.L., fied Apr. 7, 1972).
75 H.R. REP. No. 1130, supra note 17, at 3; see note 43 supra.
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feree court's ability to conduct discovery effectively.7 6 Since the actions
would be remanded to transferor courts for trial on the issues defined
in pretrial proceedings, 77 it was the function of the transferee judge to
create a body of facts on which the transferor judges could eventually
base their determinations of the legal issues.7 8 Threshold legal questions,
therefore, had to be disposed of early in pretrial proceedings so that the
scope of discovery would be narrowed.79
By insisting on the remand of transferred cases, the drafters of section
1407 demonstrated that they never intended transferee judges to exercise the summary judgment power after completion of pretrial discovery.
Yet in several recent cases, transferee judges have assumed the power to
so rule. 80 In disposing of the litigation in this fashion, transferee courts
arguably preempt the function the drafters envisioned for transferor
courts.81 The narrow statutory language does not, however, explicitly
prevent the exercise of this power, since until the cases are actually remanded, transferee judges may consider any pretrial motions, including
those for summary judgment. Moreover, a broad summary judgment
power for transferee courts is consistent with the purpose of section
1407 to provide a mechanism for more efficient disposition of related
multidistrict cases. If no genuine disputed issues of fact exist, it would
be wasteful of judicial resources for the transferee court to remand the
cases to scattered transferor courts, enabling judges unfamiliar with the
litigation to rule independently on identical questions of law. Conflicting decisions on remand, moreover, would defeat the consistency
achieved by pretrial transfer. The transferee court is the most practical
forum for resolving these questions, and a broad summary judgment
power provides the best method for disposing of the litigation.
Similar considerations of efficiency have influenced the Judicial
Panel to transfer multidistrict cases sharing common questions of law
where decision of threshold legal issues coulddispose of the litigation
76 See note 43 supra, in which the power to make legal rulings is discussed in terms of
its indispensability for the efficient conduct of pretrial proceedings.
77 H.R. REP'. No. 1130, supra note 17, at 4; see Hearings on S. 3815, supra, note 21, at
20-21 (testimony of Judge Becker). Debate at the time of passage of section 1407 also concerned the mandatory nature of the remand requirement. See 113 CoNG. REc. 22123 (1967).
78 See Control Data Corp. v. IBM, 306 F. Supp. 839, 852 (D. Minn. 1969); Hearings on
S. 3815, supra note 21, at 23 (testimony of Judge Becker).
79 Hearingson S. 3815, supra note 21, at 22 (testimony of Judge Becker).
80 E.g., Reidinger v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 329 F. Supp. 487 (E.D. Ky. 1971) (Cin-

cinnati Air Crash) (after completion of discovery, summary judgment for plaintiff granted
on issue of negligence); Jack Winter, Inc. v. Koratron Co., 327 F. Supp. 206 (N.D. Cal.
1971) (summary judgment denied on issue of patent validity because reasonable doubt
existed on other factual issues).
81 See note 78 supra.
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without extensive discovery.8 2 Although the statutory criterion is literally satisfied by the presence of common factual questions, the factual
issues often serve as a pretext for the resolution of common legal questions. 3 Actions sharing only common legal questions were not thought
by the drafters to require the same intensive pretrial discovery and the
same need for consultation and communication among district judges
and were specifically exempted from section 1407 transfer.8 4 The Panel's
rationale, however, that transfer of these cases permits optimal use of
judicial manpower and serves the interest of the parties by eliminating
separate resolution of identical motions, 5 is consistent with the broad
purpose of section 1407.
F. Class Action Claims
The most difficult function of the transferee judge is the resolution of
conflicting class action claims. Independent consideration of class definitions and representation would pose the most serious threat of
conflicting contemporaneous district court rulings, and failure to consolidate for pretrial proceedings would create the overload in the district courts that section 1407 was designed to avert.86
The Judicial Panel itself cannot resolve conflicting class action
claims, 7 nor can the question whether a class action is maintainable be
separated from the rest of the litigation and reserved for determination
by the transferor court. 8 Section 1407(a) provides for transfer of civil
82 Levy, supra note 6, at 48; Comment, Pre-Trial Consolidation in Complex Federal
Multi-DistrictLitigation, supra note 8, at 439-40.
83 Broad interpretation of what constitutes "common questions of fact" dilutes this
limitation of the Panel's ability to transfer cases. In re Fourth Class Postage Regulations,
298 F. Supp. 1326 (J.P.M.L. 1969), is widely construed as a case in which transfer, although
justified by tangential factual inquiries into the operations of the postal system, was
actually granted in order to decide the constitutionality of the statute, a purely legal
question. The crucial question in In re Air Fare Litigation, 322 F. Supp. 1013 (J.P.M.L.,
1971), was the legality of the approved fare increases; the only common factual questions
justifying transfer related to damages, particularly the definition of the classes entitled to
recovery.
84 Hearingson S. 3815, supra note 21, at 16 (testimony of Judge Becker).
85 Thus, in In re Butterfield Patent Infringement, 328 F. Supp. 513 (J.P.M.L. 1970), a
compelling reason for transfer was the lurking possibility of summary judgment on the
questions of patent validity and laches. And in In re Suess Patent Infringement Litigation,
331 F. Supp. 549 (J.P.M.L. 1971), two infringement cases had been tried before a judge on
the question of collateral estoppel. The Panel transferred another case to his docket for
resolution of the patent validity and collateral estoppel questions in all related cases.
S8 In re Plumbing Fixtures, 298 F. Supp. 484, 493 (J.P.M.L. 1968). For a discussion of
settlements in multidistrict litigation involving class action claims, see text at notes 71-72
supra.
87 In re Four Seasons Sec. Laws Litigation, 328 F. Supp. 221, 223 n.2 (J.P.M.L. 1971).
88 In re Plumbing Fixtures, 298 F. Supp. 484, 488-89 (J.P.M.L. 1968). Nor can the com-
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actions, not parts thereof; by withholding the power to separate issues
from the Panel, its drafters required that transferee courts decide class
action claims.8 9
The overlap between claims and the classes attempting to assert them
requires constant judicial scrutiny to prevent the possibility of inconsistent rulings and recoveries. 0 With all claims pending before a single
judge, the litigation can more easily be amalgamated into manageable
units and disposed of in an orderly fashion.9 1 The transferee judge can
choose among competing classes and among potential representatives
to insure that all maintainable claims and eligible classes participate in
the ultimate trial. His restructuring of the disjointed actions into what
can be termed a "super class action" may be the only form in which the
litigation can be handled by the judicial system. The pressure for transferee court disposition of these cases and the prevention of their atomization through remand is overwhelming 2 The creation of an orderly
scheme for resolution of claims militates against their dismemberment
93
and piecemeal consideration.
The best illustration of the indispensability of multidistrict transfer
and the awesome burden faced by transferee judges is the Antibiotic
plexities of overlapping class allegations be left to the voluntary cooperation of the parties.
In re Hotel Tel. Charge Antitrust Litigation, MDL Docket No. 89, filed Mar. 30, 1972).
89 Id. at 490.
90 In re Antibiotic Antitrust Actions, 333 F. Supp. 299, 301-02 (J.P.M.L. 1971).
91 Conflicting class action claims constitute a substantial proportion of the litigation
handled by transferee judges and are heavily concentrated in the antitrust and securities
areas. While the statute was not drafted exclusively to deal with these areas, the efficiencies
of pretrial transfer appear greatest therein, since discovery is more complex and extended.
Twenty-two of the fifty-three transferred dockets, including seven of eight securities cases
and fourteen of nineteen antitrust cases, involve class action claims. The patent and disaster
areas are not usually suited for the maintenance of class actions. But see text at note 127
infra.
92 In no reported cases have class action claims been remanded to the transferor courts
for trial.
93 Transferee courts have decided the following issues in cases involving class action
claims:
Inclusion of parties within previously determined classes: E.g., In re Antibiotic Antitrust Actions, 338 F. Supp. 296 (S.D.N.Y. 1971); Indiana v. Chas. Pfizer & Co., 51 F.R.D.
493 (S.D.N.Y. 1970); Burlington Hosp. v. Chas. Pfizer & Co., 48 F.R.D. 343 (S.D.N.Y. 1969).
Adequacy of class representation: E.g., Barkal v. Chas. Pfizer & Co., 51 F.R.D. 504 (S.D.
N.Y. 1970).
State parens patriae representation of its citizens: E.g., In re Antibiotic Antitrust Actions,
333 F. Supp. 278 (S.D.N.Y. 1971); In re Motor Vehicle Air Pollution Control Equip., 52
F.R.D. 898 (C.D. Cal. 1970).
Notice and exclusion problems: Pfizer, Inc. v. Lord, 449 F.2d 119 (2d Cir. 1971); Illinois
v. Harper & Row Publishers, Inc., 301 F. Supp. 484, 494 (N.D. Ill. 1969); see text at notes
100-01 infra. See generally Handler, Twenty-fourth Annual Antitrust Review, 72 CoLrom.
L. REv. 1 (1972).
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Drugs litigation."- Multiple civil treble damage suits were filed following a successful criminal prosecution in which the defendant antibiotic
drug manufacturers were convicted of conspiracy to fix prices and to
exclude competitors in violation of the Sherman Act. 95 The Judicial
Panel transferred over three hundred such actions, including many class
action claims, to the Southern District of New York."6 While discovery
proceeded, sixty-six governmental bodies, suing as class representatives
of state and county hospitals and the consuming public, accepted the
defendants' initial settlement offer 9 7 The transferee judge approved the
$100 million damage agreement as fair and equitable and established
temporary classes of participating states, hospitals, and retail purchasers
to share in its distribution. Jurisdiction was reserved to oversee administration of the fund. Similar agreements amounting to $32.5 million
were subsequently reached with nineteen private hospitals, also suing as
class representatives." Since the task of administering these agreements
and directing ongoing discovery in the nonsettling cases was too burdensome for one man, the Panel assigned the latter cases to another judge
for completion of pretrial proceedings. 99
The new transferee judge subsequently established nonsettling government entity classes and retail consumer classes, 100 approved and
ordered distribution of notice and exclusion forms, and decided several
critical questions involving the tolling of the statute of limitations
and the remoteness of certain claims. 10 1 He finally concluded that the
overlap between classes and the possibility of inconsistent recoveries
could be resolved only through a planned sequence of trials, 10 2 thus
illustrating the impossibility of fully resolving all conflicting claims even
in consolidated pretrial proceedings. Without such proceedings, however, even partial resolution of these problems could not have been
accomplished without chaotic, inconsistent decisions. The experience
of the Antibiotic Drugs cases indicates why pretrial transfer of class
action claims is a valuable, albeit often incomplete, attempt to conduct
multidistrict litigation efficiently and expeditiously.
94 See notes 95-102 infra.
95 United States v. Chas. Pfizer & Co., 281 F. Supp. 837 (S.D.N.Y. 1968), rev'd for new

trial, 426 F.2d 32 (2d Cir. 1970), aff1'd, 92 S. Ct. 731 (1972).
96 In re Antibiotic Drugs, 295 F. Supp. 1402 (J.P.M.L. 1968).
97 West Virginia v. Chas. Pfizer & Co., 314 F. Supp. 710 (S.D.N.Y. 1970).
98 Hartford Hosp. v. Chas. Pfizer & Co., 52 F.R.D. 131 (S.D.N.Y. 1971).
99 In re Antibiotic Drugs, 320 F. Supp. 586 (J.P.M.L. 1970).
10 In re Antibiotic Antitrust Actions, 333 F. Supp. 291 (S.D.N.Y. 1971); In re Antibiotic
Antitrust Actions, 333 F. Supp. 274 (S.D.N.Y. 1971).
101 In re Antibiotic Antitrust Actions, 333 F. Supp. 310 (S.D.N.Y. 1971); In re Antibiotic
Antitrust Actions, 333 F. Supp. 278 (S.D.N.Y. 1971).
102 In re Antibiotic Antitrust Actions, 333 F. Supp. 299, 301-02 (S.D.N.Y. 1971).
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G.

Section 1404(a) Transfers
Section 1404(a) authorizes transfer of any civil action to any other
district where it might have been brought if the district court finds that
it would promote the convenience of parties and witnesses and the
interest of justice. 103 Multidistrict transfer and change of venue are
complementary techniques of judicial management, permitting consolidation of cases for trial after completion of pretrial proceedings under section 1407.104 Originally, the Judicial Panel stated that an "appropriate" court could consider section 1404(a) motions, without specifying
whether transferee or transferor courts had such jurisdiction. 105 Section
1407 is completely silent on this point, but the apparently mandatory
nature of the remand clause, which provides that each case shall be remanded to the transferor court unless previously terminated in the
transferee court,10 6 implies that transferee courts lack this jurisdiction.
Nevertheless, in its promulgation of Rule 15(e), the Judicial Panel
concluded that transferee judges have authority to order such transfers
for consolidated trial. 10 7 Simultaneously, transferee judges have held
that they possess the power to transfer cases under section 1404(a), 0 8
reasoning that the remand requirement defines and limits the jurisdictional powers of the Judicial Panel, not those of transferee judges. 0 9 Although the Panel would have no authority to transfer cases for trial,
change-of-venue motions fall within the ambit of pretrial proceedings
over which transferee judges have jurisdiction.110 Thus, transferee
103

28 U.S.C. § 1404(a) (1970).

104 In re Grain Shipments, 300 F. Supp. 1402 (J.P.M.L. 1969).
105 Id. at 1404. Earlier, in In re Mid-Air Collision near Hendersonville, N.C., 297 F.

Supp. 1039, 1040 (J.P.M.L. 1969), the Panel noted that the transferor judge could consider
a section 1404(a) motion upon the completion of pretrial proceedings after remand.
106 28 U.S.C. § 1407(a) (1970).
107 Panel Rule 15(e) provides: "Each transferred action that has not been terminated in
the transferee court will be remanded to the transferor district for trial, unless ordered
transferred by the transferee judge to the transferee or other district under 28 U.S.C.
§ 1404(a) or 28 U.S.C. § 1406. In the event that the transferee judge transfers an action under
28 U.S.C. §§ 1404(a) or 1406, an order of remand shall not be necessary to authorize further
lpceedings ,including trial."
108 In re Antibiotic Antitrust Actions, 333 F. Supp. 309 (S.D.N.Y. 1971) (animal feed
cases); In re Antibiotic Antitrust Actions, 333 F. Supp. 299 (S.D.N.Y. 1971), aff'd sub. nom.
Pfizer, Inc. v. Lord, 447 F.2d 122 (2d Cir. 1971) (human consumption cases); In re Hanover,
N.H. Air Crash Disaster, MDL Docket No. 43 (D.N.H., filed June 3, 1971); Illinois v.
Harper & Row Publishers, Inc., MDL Docket Nos. 2, 4, 5, 6, 7 (N.D. Ill., filed Mar. 23,
1971); Jack Winter, Inc. v. Koratron Co., 326 F. Supp. 121 (N.D. Cal. 1971).
109 Pfizer, Inc. v. Lord, 447 F.2d 122, 124 (2d Cir. 1971).
110 Jack Winter, Inc. v. Koratron Co., 326 F. Supp. 121 (N.D. Cal. 1971), was actually
decided on this ground; the other four cases rely on the power of the transferee judge and
on the rules of the Panel.
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judges have transferred to their own dockets for trial cases previously
centralized only for pretrial proceedings. 1
In considering a section 1404(a) motion, a transferee judge tends to
employ standards different from those of a transferor judge." 2 Because
of his familiarity with the entire litigation, the transferee judge usually
takes a broad perspective, weighing the interests of all parties and of
efficient judicial administration in transfer." 3 A transferor judge, in
contrast, would consider only the interests of the parties in the case immediately before him. Since efficiency is promoted by having the same
judge conduct both pretrial proceedings and the trial, the transferee
judge is more likely to order transfer of multidistrict cases to his own
docket for trial. Yet this decision introduces a factor not normally considered in deciding a section 1404(a) motion, the convenience of the
transferee judge. 114
Transfers by transferee judges to their own dockets for trial seem to
evade the original understanding of the drafters that pretrial transfer
would not affect the place of trial of any action; 115 under current practice, section 1407 transfers often conclusively determine in which district
the actions will be tried. In general, transferee judges have used their
powers to control the ultimate disposition of transferred cases. Analysis
focusing solely on the pretrial implications of their activity ignores the
trend of transferee court rulings in multidistrict cases; the true importance of section 1407 transfer is in its impact on the final resolution
of transferred cases. Section 1404(a) transfers most forcefully pose the
crucial question to what extent transferee court judges should be permitted to retain coordinated or consolidated cases beyond the pretrial
stage.

III.

ExPANsioN OF MULTIDISTRICT TRANSFER BEYOND

PRETRIAL PROCEEDINGS

A. Devices Adopted by Transferee Judges
The outstanding operational effect of section 1407 has been the absence of actions remanded after the completion of pretrial proceedings;". transferee courts have usually attempted to decide all substantive
111 Transferee judges can transfer cases to districts other than their own for trial under
section 1404(a). See In re IBM, MDL Docket No. 18 (J.P.M.L., filed Apr. 19, 1972).
112 Levy, supra note 6, at 63-65; Comment, Pre-Trial Consolidation in Complex Federal
Multi-District Litigation, supra note 8, at 443.
113 Levy, supra note 6, at 63.
114 Id.
115 H.R. REP. No. 1130, supra note 17, at

3.

The only reported use of the remand provision is in In re Penn Central Sec. Litigation, 325 F. Supp. 309, 311 n.2 (J.P.M.L. 1971), in which two previously transferred corn116
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issues in the litigation. Although this objective may be desirable in some
cases, the procedures currently employed have proven unsatisfactory. Of
the methods available, the most direct is by summary judgment where
there are no disputed issues of fact.117 Another possible procedure is
transfer of cases under section 1404(a) to the transferee judge's regular
docket for trial.11s This method, however, is of only limited utility, since
consolidation is impossible for actions that could not have been brought
originally in the transferee district. 119
A third method for deciding substantive issues is through consent of
the parties. Since trial on a threshold legal issue can be held in a case
originally commenced in the transferee court, the result of that trial
could be made binding on the parties in the transferred cases by stipulation.120 This technique proved successful in the Butterfield Patent
litigation. 121 After completion of discovery in all cases, many defendants
whose actions had been transferred for pretrial proceedings consented to
having their cases tried by the transferee judge on the narrow issue of
patent validity. The patent was declared invalid, terminating the litigation for consenting parties and establishing a strong precedent for the
122
other pending cases. Also, in the Santa Monica Air Crash litigation,'
counsel in the transferred cases agreed to consolidated trial before the
transferee judge; the defendant aircraft manufacturer was found not to
have been negligent, and the litigation was terminated.
A fourth method of disposition involves an intercircuit assignment of
the transferee judge to the transferor districts to try cases remanded
there. In the CBS Color Tube Patent litigation, 12 3 the Panel concluded
that it would be possible to assign the transferee judge temporarily
under section 292(c) 124 to any district in which a trial must be held.
mercial paper cases were separated from promissory note cases by the Judicial Panel and
were transferred to another district along with other similar cases for coordinated or consolidated pretrial proceedings. See In re Penn Central Commercial Paper Litigation, 337
F. Supp. 1385 (J.P.M.L. 1972). Frequently, remand requests are fied before the Panel as
tardy objections to transfer of tag-along cases. E.g., In re Plumbing Fixtures, 332 F. Supp.
1047 (J.P.M.L. 1971); In re Revenue Properties Co., 814 F. Supp. 1255 (J.P.M.L. 1970). The
Panel will remand an action or separable claim prior to the completion of pretrial proceedings only upon a showing that remand would promote the just and efficient conduct
of the litigation. In re Gypsum Wallboard, MDL Docket No. 14 (J.P.M.L., filed Apr. 7,
1972) (remand denied for lack of showing of good cause).
117 See text at notes 74-85 supra.
118 See text at notes 103-15 supra.
119 See note 15 supra.
120 Jack Winter, Inc. v. Koratron Co., 327 F. Supp. 206, 210-11 (N.D. Cal. 1971); In re
Grain Shipments, 325 F. Supp. 318, 319-20 nA (J.P.M.L. 1971).
121 Butterfield v. Oculus Contact Lens Co., 332 F. Supp. 750 (N.D. Ill. 1971).
122 MDL Docket No. 34 (C.D. Cal., flied Dec. 15, 1971).
123 829 F. Supp. 540, 541 n.8 (J.P.M.L. 1971).
124 28 U.S.C. § 292(c) (1970).
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This device was used in the Antibiotic Antitrust Actions; 125 the transferee judge was assigned to the Northern District of California for the
purpose of trying the cases originally commenced in that district.
These final two devices, stipulation and intercircuit assignment, also
have serious limitations. Consent of all parties to trial in the transferee
district cannot always be obtained, and, as in the Butterfield Patent
litigation, a substantial number of parties may refuse to join. 126 Intercircuit transfers, on the other hand, are time-consuming and administratively burdensome. If they were widely used, the transferee judge
would become a nationwide circuit rider, unable to supervise his normal
docket of cases.
Whatever their effectiveness, these judicially devised methods of consolidation represent attempts to continue the efficiencies of centralized
management past the completion of pretrial proceedings. The practical
effect of these procedures is to permit trial of common issues in multidistrict cases as if the litigation were a class action.127 The resources
and expertise of the parties can be pooled for more vigorous prosecution
of the disputed issues of law and fact, but with substantial time and cost
savings to all parties.
Transferee judges have failed, however, in their attempts to create a
mechanism to achieve the benefits of consolidated trial wherever concentration past the pretrial stage is desirable. What is required, therefore, is amendment of the statute to so provide. The two primary questions to be resolved in designing this modification are in which cases
consolidated trial is appropriate and what method should be used to
effectuate their consolidation.
B.

The Appropriateness of Consolidated Trial

Although trial on issues common to all cases can produce time and
cost benefits similar to those accruing from coordinated or consolidated
pretrial proceedings, transfer for trial would not always be desirable in
12S In re Antibiotic Antitrust Actions, 333 F. Supp. 299, 301 (S.D.N.Y. 1971).
126 This was one of the strongest reasons put forth at the Senate hearings in justification

of the creation of mandatory pretrial transfers. The same argument would apply to transfer for trial purposes. See Hearings on S. 3815, supra note 21, at 28 (testimony of Charles
A. Bane).
127 "The cases tried (after transfer] will be tried in the same manner as a class action.
The plaintiffs' attorneys will determine which of them will try the case. For purposes of
trial, the court considers the appearance of an attorney in one case as an appearance in all
cases." In re Hanover, N.H. Air Crash Disaster, MDL Docket No. 43 (D.N.H., filed June 3,
1971). But see Hobbs v. Northeast Airlines, Inc., 50 F.R.D. 76 (E.D. Pa. 1970), in which a
transferor judge had already ruled that these mass tort wrongful damage claims were not
suitable for treatment as a class action. The effect of the transferee court ruling was to
allow trial of these claims as a class action, but only with respect to the issue of liability.
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all cases in which pretrial transfer is appropriate. Certain issues, such
as individual damages, can best be tried in the transferor district, where
most witnesses and evidence are readily available. 12 Moreover, separate
trials on multiple individual damage claims in the transferee court
would be likely to impose a heavy burden on the transferee judge and
impair his capacity to try other litigation. 129
In cases involving common disasters, for example, although the question of liability can usually be resolved on a consolidated basis, it is
more practical to remand each case to the transferor district for trial
0 Since most
on the individual damage claimsY.3
evidence relevant to the
deceased's earnings potential and life expectancy is located in that district, the inconvenience and expense of travel for witnesses are avoided.
This technique was adopted in the Hanover Air Crash litigation, 18 1 in
which the transferee judge transferred the cases consolidated for pretrial purposes to his own docket under section 1404(a) for trial, but
only on the question of liability. The question of damages was explicitly
reserved for local discovery and trial in the transferor courts after re82
mand.3
Even if there is a common factual background, the legal claims of the
parties may be so incompatible that it would be impossible to coordinate
the cases past the initial stages of discovery. 83 In these situations, the
cases might be separated into manageable categories and set for trial
independently; after pretrial proceedings, they could be transferred to
the appropriate districts for trial.8 4
The mere fact that actions were transferred for coordinated or consolidated pretrial proceedings does not conclusively determine that they
See H.R. REP. No. 1130, supra note 17, at 4; S. REP,. No. 454, supra note 2, at 5.
S. Rzp. No. 454, supra note 2, at 5.
180 In re Hanover, N.H. Air Crash Disaster, MDL Docket No. 43, at 2-3 (D.N.H., filed
June 3, 1971). For a critique of the application of section 1407 to disaster litigation, see
McElhaney, A Plea for the "Worm's Eye View" in Multidistrict Aviation Litigation, 37
J. AIm L. & Coar. 49 (1971); Seeley, Proceduresfor Coordinated Multidistrict Litigation:A
Nineteenth Century Mind Views With Alarm, 14 ANTimTr BuLL. 91 (1969).
131 In re Hanover, N.H. Air Crash Disaster, MDL Docket No. 43 (D.N.H., filed June 8,
1971).
182 Id. at 1-2.
183 These would typically be cases in which the claims of various groups of plaintiffs
required proof of contradictory points. See cases cited note 50 supra.
184 This separation would not prevent the transferee judge from trying all groups of
cases. The human consumption and animal feed cases in the Antibiotic Drug litigation,
for example, were separately transferred to the District of Minnesota for trial by the
tranferee judge. In re Antibiotic Antitrust Actions, 333 F. Supp. 309 (S.D.N.Y. 1971) (animal
feed cases); In re Antibiotic Antitrust Actions, 333 F. Supp. 299 (S.D.N.Y. 1971) (human
consumption cases). But see In re IBM, MDL Docket No. 18 (J.P.M.L., filed Apr. 19, 1972).
128
129
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should be tried in a consolidated fashion. 135 Subsequent separation and
transfer will insure that the actions are tried justly and efficiently, but
without sacrificing the convenience of the parties to the litigation.
C.

A Statutory Proposal
If transfer of multidistrict litigation for purposes of trial is to be permitted, it must necessarily be without regard to venue in order that all
related cases might be consolidated for trial if efficiency so demanded.
A single decision maker must determine the propriety of transfer in
such cases. The Judicial Panel could make such a decision, either as
part of its order after the initial transfer hearing or at the completion of
pretrial proceedings. The transferee judge, however, could make a
more precise evaluation of the problems revealed in the litigation;
at the completion of pretrial proceedings, he could more accurately determine the degree of subsequent consolidation that would be most just
and efficient, considering both the convenience of the parties and the
economies to the judiciary. Specifically, he could determine how much of
a burden consolidated trial would be on his responsibilities in his own
district. If consolidated trial were not appropriate, he could then remand the cases to their original districts according to the present statutory mechanism. This two-level transfer scheme thus permits initial consideration of the desirability of pretrial transfer by the Judicial Panel,
but requires subsequent evaluation of the benefits obtainable from consolidated trial in the light of problems arising during pretrial proceedings.
The House Report noted that section 1407 was drafted so that it
could easily be amended to provide for coordinating or consolidating
cases for trial as well as pretrial proceedings, if experience so suggested.136 Pretrial transfer generates great savings in time and expense,
but, as transferee judges have intuitively recognized in going beyond the
intent of the present law, dramatic efficiencies in judicial administration
can often be realized through further consolidation for trial. The Multidistrict Litigation Act should be amended to provide a coherent and
workable mechanism to replace the tentative efforts of transferee courts
to extend the principles of centralized practice beyond the pretrial
stage.
John F. Cooney
135 In some cases, however, the Panel selects the transferee district best able to serve as
the trial forum. In re Yam Processing Patent Validity Litigation, 341 F. Supp. 376 (J.P.M.L.
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136 H.R. RP. No. 1130, supra note 17, at 4.

